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Respondent. 

















Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Jerome County 
The Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge, Presiding 
Terrence R. White, ISB #1351 
Davis F. Vander Velde, ISB # 7314 
WI-IITE PERTERSON GIGRA Y 
ROSSMAN NYE & NICHOLS, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
Giltner Dairy, LLC 
Michael J. Seib, ISB # 5258 
JEROME COUNTY 
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
233 West Main 
Jerome, ID83338 
Attorney for Respondent 
Gary D. Slette 
ROBERTSON & SLETTE, PLLC 
134 Third Avenue East 
P.O. Box 1906 
Twin Falls, Idaho 83303-1906 
Attorney for intervenor 93 Golf Ranch, LLC 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner! Appellant ("Giltner") sought judicial review of a zoning decision by the 
Jerome County Board of Commissioners ("Board") pursuant to Idaho Code Section 31-
1506. Intervenor 93 Golf Ranch, LLC's brought a motion to dismiss Giltner's petition, 
which was granted by the district court on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
Giltner raises only two issues on appeal. Jerome County addresses only the 
second issue (whether I.C. § 31-1506 applies to zoning decision by a board of county 
commissioners), as it is dispositive of the case. 
Giltner seeks judicial review of a zoning decision pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
31-1506; and does so after first recognizing that the "judicial review provisions of the 
LLUPA are no longer available for review of a board of commissioners' decision on an 
application for rezone." (Appellant's Brief, at 9; referencing Burns Holdings, LLC v. 
Madison County Board of County Commissioners, 147 Idaho 660, 21 P.3d 646 (2009) 
and Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008». 
Giltner also states that "[tJhe judicial review provision of the LLUPA is found in I.C. § 
67-6521." (Appellant's Brief, at 7). This statement however, is not necessarily correct in 
that 67-6521 is not the only judicial review provision in LLUPA. Idaho Code Section 67-
6519(4) and 67-6520 also provide judicial review procedures for decisions on pennits, 
both essentially identical to 67-6521. Section 67-6535(c) is also a "judicial-review 
provision" in that it provides instruction to courts when engaged in such review. 
Furthermore, section 67-6507 allows a planning, zoning or planning and zoning 
commission "to seek judicial process" when necessary. Section 67-651 I (d) gives a 
property owner standing in court to enforce a certain provision of that statute, and 67-
6533( d) discusses the authority of a court to issue temporary restraining orders in matters 
involved with that section. Finally, and at least along the lines of dispute resolution, 67-
6510 provides for mediation procedures for land use matters. 
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There are two points being made here for consideration. The first is that all these 
judicial mentioning provisions of LLUPA show it to have many more provisions relating 
to judicial review than just simply section 67 -6521 (as Giltner at least implies). Second 
(and much more importantly), the specific referencing of the various judicial processes in 
these several sections shows that the legislature had judicial review/process in mind and 
inserted it throughout LLUPA, but only in those provisions where it specifically intended. 
Of real significance is the fact that no less than three times, in three different statutes, 
does the legislature specifically limit judicial review per the AP A to permit decisions 
only.J 
The remaining "judicial-process" sections of LLUP A (cited above) reference 
other kinds of processes that may not pertain to AP A review, but nonetheless, still do not 
expand past the "permit-issuance" limitations set by the three statutes noted in the above 
footnote. The fact that these other sections do not reference APA review, but do 
reference some form of judicial process, may be all the more significant in showing that 
the legislature wanted to limit AP A review to only those areas where it so in fact 
specified. That is, in these statutes that do not pertain to permit issuance, but where the 
legislature obviously felt some kind of judicial process needed to apply, it went ahead 
and authorized such, but not by simply reiterating the language of the footnoted statutes. 
I I.C. § 67-6519 - An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28) 
days after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinance seek judicial review 
under the procedures provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 67-6520 - An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight 
(28) days after all appellate remedies have been exhausted under local ordinance 
seek judicial review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 67-6521- An affected person aggrieved by a decision may within twenty-eight (28) days 
after all remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial 
review as provided by chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
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Instead, the legislature specifically provided for a form of judicial process thought 
needed, but steered clear of AP A review. This results in showing a conscious effort by 
the legislature to limit one's ability to obtain APA review. 
As to those remaining statutes of LLUP A that are silent to any type of judicial 
verbiage (APA language or otherwise), the legislature was clearly intending that the 
subject matter of these statutes would not be subject to judicial review. This clarity stems 
from the legislative intent carmon that holds: 
Statues that are in pari materia must be construed together to effect 
legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same 
subject. Where a statute with respect to one subject contains a certain 
provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute 
concerning a related subject is significant to show that a different intention 
existed. 
City o/Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 68, 72 
P.3d 906,909 (2003) (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
The statutes of LLUP A obviously all relate to the same subject matter of land use, 
and must therefore be construed together. In doing this, it is first noted that there are the 
eight separate statutes pointed to above that reference some form of judicial process. The 
omission of "judicial process" language from the remaining statntes of LLUP A, becomes 
quite significant as it shows a specific intent by the legislature that is completely opposite 
from the intent of the eight "judicial-process/review" statutes. This clearly being that 
those provisions of LLUP A that do not contain specified judicial review/process 
language were not intended by the legislature to be subject to direct judicial review via 
the APA.2 
2 This said with the understanding that these provisions still may be subject to collateral actions. See Burt v. 
City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65 (1983), holding that while a legislative zoning decision is not subject to 
direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by means of collateral actions such as declaratory 
actions. 
4 
This analysis of the legislature's intent is even more firmly cemented in regard to 
section 67-6511 because it is one of the eight LLUPA statutes that contain judicial-
process verbiage. Real significance arises from the fact that it is sections 67-6511(a) and 
(b) that ultimately provided the basis for the Board's zoning decision that Giltner now 
challenges. Although these two subsections do not contain any judicial verbiage, 
paragraph (d) of 67-6511 does, albeit not of the nature that is of any help to Giltner's 
present attempt to obtain judicial review.3 Nevertheless, the fact that such verbiage is in 
one of the provisions of 67-6511, but omitted from the remaining three (a, b and c), 
causes the above analysis of legislative intent (stemming from City of Sandpoint, supra) 
to be focused specifically down to the exact statute at issue. 
As indicated, an examination of 67-6511 on its face shows only the last paragraph 
of that statute (subsection (d» to contain any judicial verbiage. This reveals that the 
legislature, in drafting the whole of 67-6511, surgically inserted such judicial verbiage 
into the statute so that it only applied to those limited circumstances stemming from 
paragraph (d). Going further, and examining 67-6511 through the application of City of 
Sandpoint, supra, it is plain that because no judicial verbiage is contained within the 
parameters of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), the legislature simply did not intend any form 
of judicial process be available to any circumstances/decisions arising from those three 
subsections. 
The existing language found in section 67 -6511 (d) becomes even more 
problematic for Giltner when its arguments concerning Idaho Code Section 31-1506 are 
examined. This is because it (I.e. § 31-1506) holds in pertinent part: 
3 I.e. § 67-6511(d) gives a property owner standing in court to enforce the provisions of that subsection. 
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Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, order or 
proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person aggrieved thereby 
within the same time and in the same maimer as provided in chapter 52, 
title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of actions. 
(I.e. § 31-1506; emphasis added). The emphasized language is the limiting portion of 
the statute that controls or determines when the parameters of 31-1506 can be applied. 
That is to say, not every single act, order or proceeding of a board can be judicially 
reviewed pursuant this 31-1506. Instead, only those actions of the board that do not fall 
within the parameters of some other statute that concerns judicial review. It must further 
be kept in mind (as analyzed above) that such parameters are capable of extending 
beyond the specific statute itself. In some instances (like the one at hand), the judicial 
review procedures being "otherwise provided," may be provided by not being provided. 
That is, by not including verbiage in a statute that specifically prohibits direct judicial 
review, the legislature (under certain circumstances) is in fact intending that the absence 
of the verbiage is in fact the prohibition against the statue being subject to such review. 
In this regard then, the "non-specifying" statute itself otherwise provides for purposes of 
determining 31-1506 applicability. 
With the issue at hand, it is clear that LLUPA (and 67-6511 on its own) does 
otherwise provide the procedures/requirements for judicial review, as there are several 
provisions within the act (and one within the statute itself) that discuss the parameters of 
such review. As discussed above, the absence of such judicial verbiage from the 
remaining statutes or provisions of LLUPA, show that they were indirectly being 
prohibited from any kind of judicial review or process. Regardless, whether the 
challenged zoning decision is viewed as falling within the parameters of those statutes 
that contain specific judicial review language, or those that don't (or the parameters of 
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both), the fact remains that judicial review procedures are in fact otherwise provided for 
zoning decisions stemming from LLUPA and section 67-6511 specifically. Accordingly, 
the limiting language of 31-1506 is triggered and its provisions prevented from being 
applied to the Board's zoning decision as argued by Giltner. 
In sum, Giltner is simply in error in its implication that LLUPA has only one 
judicial review provision, as there are several. Further, Giltner is in error in its claim that 
judicial review of zoning decisions is not prohibited by any provision of LL UP A. It is 
the very omission of such judicial review language from 67-6511 that in fact prohibits 
judicial review of zoning decisions. Because LLUPA does otherwise provide for judicial 
review procedures, the limiting language of the very statute that Giltner attempts to reach 
the APA with activates and prevents such from being accomplished. 
If section 31-1506's applicability to this matter is still questioned, then another 
prong of statutory interpretation that should be considered is that which examines 
legislative history. To this regard, Idaho courts have held that if a "statute is ambiguous, 
then it must be construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to mean. To 
determine that intent, we examine ... [among other things, the statute's] legislative history. 
City of Sandpoint, supra, 139 Idaho at 68, 72 P.3d at 909. 
In examining the history of 31-1506, the Statement of Purpose behind the statute 
is first noted. It reads: 
The purpose of this bill is to provide for the appeal of county 
commissioner decisions in the same manner as judicial review of actions 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code. 
The current process for appeals is archaic and inconsistent with other 
sections of county law. The planning and zoning and medical indigency 
appeals are conducted as appeals under the AP A. 
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The current process of appellate procedure makes the district judge the 
fourth or "super" commissioner with the ability to overrule the factual 
determinations and judgments of three individuals. 
The types of decisions that are appealed are administrative or executive in 
nature and the more appropriate method would be to use the AP A. This 
method of appeal will protect the rights of those affected by county 
commission decisions while giving consideration to county commission 
judgments. 
S.L. 1993, ch. 103, § 2 (emphasis added). The emphasized language in the second 
paragraph shows that the legislature clearly viewed planning and zoning and medical 
indigency as established areas of law, separate from those that 31-1506 was intended to 
involve. Also evident is the view that the existing plauning and zoning (and medical 
indigency) procedures for utilizing the AP A were considered so proficient and well 
working that such could serve as an example of how to structure procedures for those 
areas oflaw outside planning and zoning. The legislature obviously viewed planning and 
zoning as an area of law not in need of strengthening by the 31-1506 provisions. In other 
words, there was no recognized deficiency in LLUP A that 31-1506 was intended to fix. 
Instead, it was meant to provide relief to those other areas of county law that were in fact 
"broken" by not having AP A access. Because planning and zoning already did, the 
provisions of 31-1506 were not meant to apply to it. 
The other areas of law that 31-1506 was designed for are identified in the 
emphasized language in the forth paragraph of the cited Statement of Purpose. This 
language states that the "types of decisions that are appealed [pursuant to 31-1506] are 
administrative or executive in nature. S.L. 1993, ch. 103, § 2. Zoning decisions under 
LLUP A are for the most part legislative, which further demonstrates the intended non-
applicability of 31-1506 to such decisions. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner's application for judicial review 
should be dismissed and the Board's decisions in this matter should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~fMarCh 2010. 
Michael J. Seib -== 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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